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Abstract
We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strate-
gically discloses environmental information and a non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO) may audit and penalize the firm for failing to fully
disclose its environmental impacts. We identify conditions under which
NGO punishment of greenwash backfires, inducing the firm to become
less rather than more forthcoming about its environmental performance.
We show that complementarities with NGO auditing may justify public
policies encouraging firms to adopt environmental management systems.
Mandatory disclosure rules offer the potential for better performance than
NGO auditing, but the necessary penalties may be so large as to be po-
litically unpalatable. If so, a mix of mandatory disclosure rules, NGO
auditing and environmental management systems may be needed to in-
duce full environmental disclosure.
1 Introduction
Environmental issues have been on the corporate radar screen for years. Thou-
sands of firms participate in the Environmental Protection Agency’s partnership
programs, and many more participate in industry-led environmental programs
such as those of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the
Chicago Climate Exchange, and the American Chemistry Council’s “Responsi-
ble Care” program.1 Despite these efforts, large portions of the public continue
to view business as an enemy of the environment. Furthermore, although com-
panies naturally want to publicize their environmentally-friendly actions, they
are often surprisingly hesitant to promote their environmental successes or to
∗We would like to thank Mike Baye, Rick Harbaugh, Charlie Kolstad, John Morgan, and
participants in seminars at the American Economic Association meetings, Dartmouth, Indiana
University, UC Berkeley, and UC Santa Barbara for their helpful comments.
†Ross School of Business, University of Michigan.
‡Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.
1For an introduction to corporate environmental strategy and its relation to public policy,
see Lyon and Maxwell (2004b).
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issue detailed environmental reports. Part of the reason appears to be that
activists react more angrily to firms that lay claim to being virtuous, and then
are discovered to have feet of clay, than to firms that never make such claims.
For example, BP makes frequent public claims about its efforts to reduce global
warming yet was denounced at the Johannesburg Earth Summit, while Exxon
has for years been among the loudest skeptics about climate change yet attracts
less attention from activists. Indeed, based on his interviews with managers in
charge of corporate social responsibility, Peloza (2005) finds that “Many man-
agers worry that by overtly promoting their participation stakeholders might
view the activity as self-serving. In fact, many respondents reported minimal
or no attempts of self-promotion.” For example, one of his survey respondents
commented that “We’re pretty sensitive. We don’t want to go out thumping our
chests saying ‘oh, aren’t we wonderful and here’s all the great things we do!’ We
want people to see for themselves and they can draw their own conclusions.”2
Similar concerns surround business efforts to be socially responsible.
Part of the reason managers hesitate to promote their good environmental
deeds is that many such actions are attacked as “greenwash” by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). Often these NGOs attempt to punish companies they
view as greenwashers by embarrassing them in the media, and encouraging
consumers to boycott them.3 At the 2002 Earth Summmit in Johannesburg,
a group of NGOs held a Greenwash Academy Awards event to criticize com-
panies that falsely promote themselves as environmentally responsible and to
“recognize these companies for what they are: hypocrites." Winner for Best
Greenwash was “BP for their Beyond Petroleum rebranding campaign," which
highlights the company’s investments in renewable energy without mentioning
their major efforts in petroleum exploration. Among the other awards, South
African electricity firm Eskom was Runner up for Best Picture “for being a
key member of Business Action for Sustainable Development while generating
electricity from coal and nukes." Monsanto was Runner Up for the Lifetime
Achievement Award for its “tireless promotion of Roundup Ready GM [genet-
ically modified] crops as a solution to world hunger."4 Ralph Nader reveals a
similar skepticism regarding corporate social efforts:
“One recent misstep is the U.N.’s ‘Global Compact.’ With the dis-
appointing support of some international human rights and envi-
ronmental organizations, the U.N. has asked multinational corpo-
rations to sign on to the compact’s unenforceable and overly vague
code of conduct. Companies are able to sign on to the compact and
‘bluewash’ themselves, as critics at the Transnational Research and
Action Center in San Francisco have labeled the effort by image-
impaired corporations to repair public perceptions by hooking up
2See Peloza (2005), p. 16.
3 See the instructions for “How to Stop It" under Greenwash 101 at
http://www.thegreenlife.org/greenwash101.html.




The activists criticizing firms like BP and Monsanto are undoubtedly trying
to press these firms to improve their environmental and social performance.
Nevertheless, if companies fear being publicly “smeared” for their environmental
and social initiatives, this outcome may not be achieved. Perhaps unfortunately,
activists often react more angrily to firms that lay claim to being virtuous,
and then are discovered to have feet of clay, than it does to firms that never
make such claims. For example, BP makes frequent public claims about its
efforts to reduce global warming yet is denounced at the Johannesburg Earth
Summit, while Exxon has for years been among the loudest skeptics about
climate change yet attracts less attention from activists. Unfortunately, popular
usage of the term “greenwash" tends to be both strident and vague. For
example, in their book on greenwash, Greer and Bruno (1996) never actually
define the term. On the first page of the Introduction, however, they complain
that transnational corporations “are preserving and expanding their markets
by posing as friends of the environment and leaders in the struggle to eradicate
poverty.” The implication is clearly that companies are misrepresenting their
environmental performance. However, our reading about greenwash indicates
that firms’ environmental claims are typically not false, although they often
fail to present the full picture. It turns out this distinction has important
implications for the effectiveness of NGO campaigns against greenwashers, and
also suggests some novel public policy measures.
In this paper, we present what is to our knowledge the first economic analy-
sis of greenwash. Since public discussion of greenwash is often polemical and
imprecise, we begin in section 2 by developing a clear formal definition of green-
wash, and distinguishing it from other “disinformation” strategies. In section
3, we build a simple model in which a company conducts multiple projects with
environmental impacts that may turn out well or turn out poorly. Good re-
sults, if publicly known, produce rewards (which may come about through the
market or through political or social forces) while bad results are damaging.
The firm has the option whether or not to reveal its performance on any activ-
ities. In these respects, the model follows the disclosure literature in finance
and accounting.
Where we depart from the disclosure literature is in section 4, where we add
the phenomena of increased public scrutiny of firms that selectively report good
news, and public backlash against perceived greenwash. It would seem that the
purpose of the punishment is to prompt full disclosure, but we find that there are
many circumstances in which this does not happen. We characterize fully how
the possibility of NGO punishment influences the firm’s disclosure decisions,
and show how these effects depend upon underlying parameters reflecting the
firm’s probability of success in its environmental activities, and the probability
5Ralph Nader, "Corporations And The UN: Nike And Others "Bluewash" Their
Images," San Francisco Bay Guardian, September 18, 2000. Available at
http://www.commondreams.org/views/091900-103.htm
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the firm is informed about the outcome of its activities at the time it makes a
disclosure. We find that punishing greenwash is more likely to motivate full
disclosure in settings where the probability of success is low and the likelihood
that the firm is informed is high, that is, for firms in dirty industries that
are well informed about their own environmental impacts. In section 5, we
consider potential complementarities between NGO auditing of greenwash and
corporate adoption of an environmental management system (EMS), and show
that these complementarities may justify public policies encouraging firms to
adopt EMSs. Our analysis points to a new rationale for encouraging firms to
adopt EMSs: with an EMS in place, the firm is more likely to be well informed
about its own environmental impact, and more importantly, the market knows
that the firm is more likely to be well informed. As a result the firm is unable
to hide behind the veil of ignorance when it fails to fully disclose the impacts
of its actions, and is thereby pressured to fully disclose. In section 6, we study
the effects of mandatory disclosure rules (such as those created by the Public
Company Accounting and Reform Act of 2002, commonly know as Sarbanes-
Oxley). We show that mandatory disclosure rules offer the potential for better
performance than NGO auditing, but that the necessary penalties may be so
large as to be politically unpalatable. Finally, we consider the interaction
between mandatory disclosure rules, NGO auditing, and the adoption of EMSs,
and offer some tentative suggestions regarding how these mechanisms can best
be combined. Section 7 concludes.
2 What is Greenwash?
Formal analysis of greenwash requires a clear definition of the phenomenon. Un-
fortunately, popular usage of the term, and even academic discussion of it, tends
to be broad and vague. As mentioned above, in their book on greenwash, Greer
and Bruno (1996) never actually define the term. Even academic discussions
can be surprisingly broad. Laufer (2003), for example, presents a set of ele-
ments of greenwashing that include “confusion,” “fronting,” and “posturing.”
Confusion (p. 257) is achieved through “careful document control and strict
limits on the flow of information made available to regulators and prosecutors.”
Fronting (p. 257) “is realized by subordinate scapegoating or reverse whistle
blowing,” and may involve such actions as “cast doubt on the severity of the
problem” or “emphasize uncertainty associated with the problem.” Posturing
(p. 256) involves the use of “front groups” to influence legislation or suggest
that particular policies enjoy widespread “grassroots” support. While we find
these distinctions useful, in our view, these activities differ too much to be as
a single phenomenon; indeed, we have already modeled the use of “astroturf
lobbying” through “front groups” in Lyon and Maxwell (2004a).6
Turning to the dictionary, we find thatWebster’s New Millenium Dictionary
6Astroturf lobbying involves the provision of soft information targeted at a public decision-
maker to influence policy decisions. Greenwash involves public disclosure of hard information
targeted to influence stock prices.
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of English defines greenwash as “The practice of promoting environmentally
friendly programs to deflect attention from an organization’s environmentally
unfriendly or less savory activities.” The Concise Oxford English Dictionary
(10th Edition) defines it as: “Disinformation disseminated by an organization
so as to present an environmentally responsible public image; a public image of
environmental responsibility promulgated by or for an organization etc. but per-
ceived as being unfounded or intentionally misleading.” Both these definitions
emphasize the idea that the public has limited information about corporate en-
vironmental performance, and that corporations therefore can manipulate the
dissemination of information to mislead the public. These ideas are consistent
with what Laufer refers to as “confusion.”
The term “disinformation” goes somewhat further than mere ”confusion,”
and implies the provision of deliberately false or fraudulent messages. To us,
however, corporate greenwashing does not seem to fit this definition. Instead,
the typical concerns raised by NGOs are that companies present positive in-
formation out of context in a way that could be misleading to individuals who
lack background information about the company’s full portfolio of activities.
Consider the following example, taken from Don’t Be Fooled: The Ten Worst
Greenwashers of 2003 :7
“Royal Caribbean points to its advanced wastewater treatment sys-
tems as a sign of environmental progressiveness, yet they are in-
stalled on just 3 of the company’s 26 cruise ships. The advanced
systems are only found on its Alaskan fleet, which due to Alaskan
law are subject to the strictest environmental standards in the in-
dustry. Royal Caribbean deems them unnecessary on cruise ships
that travel other routes.”
This example, like those outlined in the Introduction, depicts a company
making a statement that is true, yet not the whole truth. We view this as
paradigmatic of greenwash. In fact, Don’t Be Fooled implicitly agrees with this
perspective. Consider its discussion of BP’s "On the Street" campaign:
“On the Street” is only selectively honest. The ads mention BP’s
solar power and clean fuel initiatives, but fail to mention other im-
portant initiatives. For example, during 2003, BP made an “ultra-
deep” petroleum discovery off the coast of Angola, launched an oil
products terminal in the expanding market of Guangdong, China,
and acquired a 50% stake in Russia’s third-largest oil and gas busi-
ness. Contrary to the focus of “On the Street”, BP’s innovations and
investments are by no means limited to environmental endeavors."8
To us, it seems absurd that the public would believe all BP investments are
environmental. Nevertheless, the BP example is of interest because it supports
7See Johnson (2003).
8 Johnson (2003), page 14.
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our view that greenwash can be defined as the selective disclosure of positive
information about a company’s environmental or social performance, without
full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions.9
An excellent example of selective disclosure comes the Department of En-
ergy’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting program, created by section 1605b
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Kim and Lyon (2006) show that electric
utility participants in the 1605(b) program reported reductions in their green-
house gas emissions during the period 1995-2003, but their actual emissions
rose. Furthermore, during the same period, non-participant utilities reduced
their emissions. This misleading reporting behavior is not illegal, for the pro-
gram allows participants great flexibility in how they choose to report emissions
reductions. In particular, firms can choose to report at the “project level” or
the “entity level.” The former allows a firm to report only on the outcomes
of successful projects, while remaining silent about its aggregate performance.
This is precisely what we mean by the term greenwash.
Note that greenwash is not the same as having a poor record of environmen-
tal performance. A firm can have a poor record without presenting any positive
information about itself, or can have a relatively good record while simultane-
ously promoting its positive actions publicly and failing to discuss its (few)
negative environmental impacts. Note also that greenwash is not the same as
simply failing to report negative information; greenwash involves the additional
step of selectively choosing to report positive information. These distinctions
will turn out to have important implications as we develop our formal model
below.
3 Basic Model
Our model focuses on a single firm, whose stock is traded publicly, and a non-
governmental organization (NGO). The firm has N different activities that each
have some potential environmental impact.10 The magnitude of N is assumed to
be common knowledge, e.g., available on the firm’s web site or Annual Report;
the non-environmental aspects of the firm’s operations are assumed to be already
incorporated into the firm’s market value. However, the firm’s environmental
profile, i.e., the impact of the firm’s portfolio of “environmentally friendly"
activities, is not known at the outset of the model. We assume the market sets
the firm’s value at its actuarily fair level.11
There are 3 periods. Let Vt represent the expected value of the firm in
period t. At period 0, there is common knowledge about the likelihood there
9Empirical research in accounting suggests that this is a common practice for firms that
choose to engage in corporate environmental disclosure; see, for example, Deegan and Rankin
(1996).
10We refer to environmental impacts for concreteness, but could just as easily refer to
corporate social responsibility more generally.
11The model draws upon the work of Shin (2003), but departs from it by using an addi-
tive rather than a multiplicative structure for payoffs, and by incorporating monitoring and
punishment of hypocrisy.
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will be a liability associated with any given activity. Each activity generates
for the firm a “success" of value u (e.g., an outcome that improves the firm’s
public image) with probability r, and a “failure" of value d < u with probability
1 − r. Thus, the expected number of environmental failures the firm faces is
simply (1− r)N. Its market value in period 0 is
V0 = N(ru+ (1− r)d) + eV , (1)
where eV is the total value created by the firm aside from its environmental
impacts. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will simplify notation
by normalizing eV to 0. At period 2, all information about environmental
impacts is revealed and becomes common knowledge, and is incorporated into
stock prices. The important action in the model takes place in the interim
period 1, during which the manager attempts to influence the firm’s stock price
through the information he discloses.12
We assume there is a probability θ that the manager actually learns the social
impact of the activity by period 1.13 Thus, at the interim period, the expected
number of activities for which the manager has information on social outcomes
is θN. The expected number of activities known to have social liabilities at the
interim period is θ(1 − r)N. The manager has the ability to disclose publicly
the number of activities that are known to be successes. We assume that all
such disclosures are verifiable by outside parties. Thus, the manager is free to
selectively withhold information, but he cannot actually lie to outsiders. We
assume the manager adopts a disclosure strategy that maximizes the value of
the firm.
Let n be the actual number of activities whose liabilities are known at the
interim period, s be the number of successes and f the number of failures, so
that n = s + f. Let the manager’s disclosures of the number of successes and
failures be given by bs and bf. We assume V1 = E(V2). If the market knows
s and f , as would be the case if the manager fully disclosed its information in
period 1, then
V1 = E(V2) = us+ df + (N − s− f)(ru+ (1− r)d), (2)
where u = the additive impact of a success on the firm’s value and d = the
additive impact of a failure on the firm’s value. This formula is quite intuitive,
since u and d are the values of successes and failures, respectively, and (ru+(1−
r)d) is the expected value of an activity whose social impact remains unknown.
If the manager discloses bs > 0, and the total number of disclosures bs+ bf is
less than N , the NGO may investigate the manager’s report for the possibility of
12There are many reasons a manager wants to influence the stock price, e.g. compensation
packages that are linked to stock price performance. For further details, see Milgrom and
Roberts (1992).
13 It is worth noting that we would expect θ to be greater for firms that have created an
environmental management system. We return to this issue in section 6.
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greenwash (i.e., that the manager has a bad outcome that he failed to disclose).14
With probability α the NGO obtains hard (verifiable) information about the
true values of s and f at the interim period and mounts a campaign against the
firm that imposes a punishment of cost P on the firm; with probability 1 − α
it learns nothing and takes no action against the firm. The punishment might
come about because the NGO triggers a consumer boycott, because it creates
an advertising campaign that damages the firm’s value, or through some other
channel that the firm finds costly.15
We are interested in Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE), which involve spec-
ifying a disclosure strategy for the manager, a market valuation, and a set of
beliefs for each time t such that (a) the disclosure strategy (bs, bf) is a best re-
sponse mapping for a firm with actual social profile (s, f), given the market’s
pricing policy and the beliefs of the market and the NGO, (b) V1 = E(V2)
given the market’s beliefs at period 1 and the manager’s disclosure strategy,
and (c) at period 0 the market believes the expected number of social liabilities
is rN, and at period 1 it computes the expected number of social liabilities using
Bayes’ rule, conditional on any social reports. We will focus on pure strategy
equilibria.
It is easy to see that if the market believed the manager always truthfully
disclosed all successes and failures, then the manager would have incentives
to report f = 0. Obviously a success is more valuable than a failure, since
u > d. Thus, the expected value of an activity whose social impact is unknown
is greater than the value of a failure, that is, ru+(1− r)d > d. As a result, the
manager always prefers to minimize the number of failures reported, and report
only the successes; full disclosure is not an equilibrium strategy.16
If the manager follows a strategy of partial disclosure in equilibrium, and
the market knows this, then the firm’s expected value at the interim stage is





is the probability of success of an activity conditional on the fact that the
manager has not disclosed information about that activity.17 Note that this
expression has the same structure as equation (2), except that r (the ex ante
probability that an activity succeeds) in (2) is replaced by q (the conditional
probability that an undisclosed activity succeeds) in (3). The probability an
undisclosed project succeeds is
14To simplify the analysis, we will assume the NGO commits ex ante to audit with fixed
probability whenever bn < N .
15Baron and Diermeier (2005) present a model of strategic NGO activism in which firms
are punished for bad social outcomes, rather than being punished for hypocrisy.
16 Shin (2003) refers to the strategy of not disclosing any failures as “sanitization,” but
does not distinguish situations where the firm has positive as well as negative news to report,
which are the sorts of situations in which hypocrisy may become a problem.
17Recall that by Bayes’ Rule, the probability an undisclosed project succeeds is q =
Pr(success|undisclosed) = Pr(success&undisclosed)/Pr(undisclosed) = r(1− θ)/(1− rθ).
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The partial disclosure equilibrium can be supported by a set of off-equilibrium
beliefs on the part of the market that if the manager ever reports f > 0, then
all undisclosed outcomes are failures.18
It is natural to ask whether the NGO can effectively punish partial disclosure
without auditing, e.g. by penalizing the firm retroactively based on the ultimate
outcomes in period 2. It turns out this is not possible. As we noted in section
2 above, punishing partial disclosure is distinct from simply punishing the firm
for bad social outcomes.19 Punishing partial disclosure involves punishing firms
that were aware of, but failed to disclose, a failure. At period 2, however, all
the NGO knows is the ultimate number of failures, not the number that were
known at the interim period. Thus, it is impossible to punish partial disclosure
per se by only observing period 2 outcomes. Instead, it is essential to have
some sort of independent auditing structure in period 1. This is the issue to
which we now turn.
4 Equilibria with Monitoring and Punishment
In this section we assess how auditing by an NGO affects the manager’s in-
centives to make social disclosures. We fully characterize the set of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria that can emerge in the model, and show how they are re-
lated to the underlying parameters of the model. This analysis prepares us
for a detailed examination in section 5 of how changes in expected penalties for
greenwash change the nature of equilibria in the model.
4.1 Equilibria with Auditing by an NGO
In order to keep the analysis tractable and focused, we present it in the con-
text of a model with N = 2. (Even with this simplication, some derivations
of formulae are complicated enough that we relegate them to the Appendix.)
This is the simplest setting in which partial disclosure can emerge as an equi-
librium outcome. Furthermore, conducting the analysis for general N would
significantly complicate the notation, but is unlikely to yield qualitatively new
insights. Table 1 presents the firm’s value for each set of possible reports the
manager can make at period 1. In each box, the value consists of two compo-
nents, each of which is indexed by the number of successes and failures reported
by the manager at period 1. The first component is the firm’s value as assessed
by the market, and the second is the penalty imposed by the NGO. We will
18While this is not the only set of off-equilibrium beliefs that support the sanitization
strategy, it is the simplest.
19Baron and Diermeier (2005) study the latter situation.
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use the notation V1(bs, bf) to indicate the market’s valuation of the firm when
it makes the disclosure (bs, bf). Note that when bn ≡ bs + bf = 2 the market
has no problem inferring the firm’s true value, since information disclosures are
verifiable. These values are easily seen to be V1(0, 2) = 2d, V1(2, 0) = 2u, and
V1(1, 1) = u + d, and are presented on the diagonal in Table 1. It is only in
states where bn ≡ bs+ bf < 2 that we must carefully analyze the market’s inference
problem. (It is also worth noting that if the firm faced no penalties it would al-
ways pursue the strategy of partial disclosure, because it raises the firm’s value,
giving it a false appearance of virtue; this is precisely the case treated above in
section 3.)
2 V1(0, 2)
1 V1(0, 1) V1(1, 1)
0 V1(0, 0) V1(1, 0)− αP V1(2, 0)bfÁbs 0 1 2
Table 1: Value of the Firm for Possible Reports (bs, bf) in period 1
We focus on the case in which the true state is (1, 1), as this is the only
possible case–for N = 2–when partial disclosure can occur. Specifically,
partial disclosure would consist of claiming the state is (1, 0) when it is really
(1, 1). This is the type of behavior that activists label greenwash, since it
presents a false appearance of being better than one really is in truth. The
firm receives no punishment for any situation except when it is a type (1, 1) and
discloses (1, 0). Hence our focus is on what the manager will report when (s, f) =
(1, 1). There are four reporting possibilities: (bs, bf) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}.
Given the arguments we have made above, however, it is clear that the manager
will never report (bs, bf) = (0, 1), so we focus on the other three cases in sequence.
In order to understand the manager’s reporting incentives, we must know
how the market will interpret each of the three possible reports. Consider them
in turn. The probability that the state is actually (1, 1) can then be computed
via Bayes’ Rule. Table 2 below presents the prior probability of each state
at the interim period, along with the value the market attaches to that state.
It is easy to see that reporting (1, 0) earns the firm a better value than does
reporting (1, 1), since the expected value of a project, ru+ (1− r)d, is greater
than the known value of a failure, d.
Type Probability V1(s, f)
(2, 0) r2θ2 2u
(1, 0) 2rθ(1− θ) u+ (ru+ (1− r)d)
(1, 1) 2r(1− r)θ2 u+ d
(0, 0) r2θ2 2(ru+ (1− r)d)
(0, 1) 2(1− r)θ(1− θ) d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)
(0, 2) (1− r)2θ2 2d
Table 2: Interim Period States, Probabilities, and Values
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We will use the notation µ(bs, bf ; s, f) to indicate the probability the mar-
ket assigns to the manager playing reporting strategy (bs, bf) when the state is
(s, f).20 In addition, we will define Ψ(bs, bf) as the probability the market assigns
to observing a report (bs, bf); this is the sum of the probabilities of each interim
type of firm multiplied by the probability that type reports (bs, bf). For example,
Ψ(0, 0) = (1− θ)2µ(0, 0|0, 0) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1)
+(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2) + 2r(1− r)θ2µ(0, 0|1, 1).
We turn now to the expected value the firm obtains in state (1, 1) from
alternative possible disclosure strategies. If the firm reports (1, 1), the market
knows the state with certainty, and the firm has market value
E[1, 1|1, 1] = u+ d. (4)
If the firm in state (1, 1) reports (1, 0), then the market believes the state
is either (1, 0) and the firm is revealing truthfully; (2, 0) and the firm is failing
to report a success; or (1, 1) and the firm is engaging in greenwash. Thus,
Ψ(1, 0) = 2rθ(1− θ)µ(1, 0|1, 0)+ r2θ2µ(1, 0|2, 0)+2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1). If the
NGO audits, and finds that the state is really (1, 1) but the firm engaged in
greenwash, then the NGO launches a campaign against the firm that imposes a
penalty P. The firm’s expected value from reporting (1, 0) is






2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(1, 0)
− αP. (5)
If the firm in state (1, 1) reports (0, 0), the market recognizes that the state
may be (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2) or (1, 1).21 Note that there is no possibility of a
punishment in this case, since a report of (0, 0) does not constitute greenwash,
since it does not aver any positive outcomes. The firm’s expected value is
E[0, 0|1, 1] = [ru+ (1− r)d] (1− θ)
22µ(0, 0|0, 0)
Ψ(0, 0)
+[d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)]2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
+2d
(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2)
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [u+ d]
2r(1− r)θ2µ(0, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
.(6)
Expressions (5) and (6) appear complicated, but are actually quite simple in
equilibrium. For example, the manager never has incentives to hide a success,
20 In equilibrium, of course, we must have µ(bs, bf ; s, f) equal to the firm’s true probability of
playing a given strategy.
21A firm in state (1, 0) or (2, 0) has no incentive to report (0, 0).
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so a firm in state (2, 0) will never report (1, 0). Thus we know µ(1, 0|2, 0) = 0.
Furthermore, the NGO is assumed to only punish what it views as greenwash,
that is, partial disclosure, which means there is no punishment for reporting
(0, 0); thus, firms in states (0, 1) or (0, 2) always have incentives to report (0, 0),
and µ(0, 0|0, 0) = µ(0, 0|0, 1) = µ(0, 0|0, 2) = 1. Furthermore, when we solve
for the truthful disclosure equilibrium, it must be the case that in equilib-
rium the manager truthfully reports the firm’s state when it is a (1, 1), that
is, µ(1, 1; 1, 1) = 1 and µ(0, 0; 1, 1) = 0, and the manager does not report falsely,
that is, µ(1, 0; 1, 1) = 0. Substituting in these values of µ(·) greatly simplifies
equations (5) and (6).
There are three types of pure-strategy equilibria that can emerge in this
model in state (1, 1). The firm: a) fully discloses the state, b) engages in partial
disclosure, or c) does not disclose at all. We now examine each of these three
equilibria in turn.
4.2 Full Disclosure Equilibrium
In order for a firm in state (1, 1) to disclose fully, we require E[1, 1|1, 1] >
E[0, 0|1, 1] and E[1, 1|1, 1] > E[1, 0|1, 1]. In addition, if market participants
believe the full disclosure equilibrium is being played, their beliefs must reflect
the nature of this equilibrium, that is, they believe that with probability one a
firm in state (1, 1) discloses fully rather than engaging in partial disclosure or
not disclosing at all. Formally, this means that µ(0, 0|1, 1) = µ(1, 0|1, 1) = 0,
and µ(1, 1|1, 1) = 1.
Since disclosed information is verifiable, it is easy to see that
E[1, 1|1, 1] = u+ d.
Understanding the payoff for non-disclosure is more complex. By definition,
in the full disclosure equilibrium the market believes that a firm in state (1, 1)
will fully disclose. Hence, when the market observes non-disclosure, it concludes
the state is (0, 0), (0, 1), or (0, 2). The market then assigns the firm an expected
value that reflects the payoff of each of these three states, weighted by the
probability of each one occurring, conditional on the observation that the firm
disclosed nothing. Calculation details are in the Appendix, but some algebraic
manipulation reveals that
E[0, 0|1, 1] = 2 (d(1− r) + ru(1− θ))
(1− rθ) .
Finally, the expected value of partial disclosure is
E[1, 0|1, 1] = u+ (ru+ (1− r)d)− αP.
The intuition for this value is simple: market participants believe the full
disclosure equilibrium is being played, so the only time a firm would report (1, 0)
is when the state is (1, 0). One can see immediately that if the expected penalty
were αP = 0, then the firm would always prefer to disclose (1, 0) rather than
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(1, 1), since by so doing the firm creates an impression of being more socially
responsible than it is in fact. The only thing that will prevent the firm in state
(1, 1) from making such a disclosure is the threat of a punishment if it is found
guilty of greenwash.
In order for full disclosure to be a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the market’s
beliefs must be consistent with actual firm behavior, and it must be the case that
E[1, 1|1, 1] > E[0, 0|1, 1] and E[1, 1|1, 1] > E[1, 0|1, 1]. We have found it helpful
to visualize the payoffs from the three disclosure strategies in a three-dimensional
diagram such as Figure 1, which depicts the case where u = 1.5, d = .5, and
αP = .3. The dark-shaded surface represents profits from non-disclosure,
E[0, 0|1, 1]; the medium-shaded surface shows the profits from partial disclo-
sure, E[1, 0|1, 1]; and the lightly-shaded surface shows the profits from full dis-
closure, E[1, 1|1, 1]. For the full disclosure equilibrium, the relevant region in



















Figure 1: Full Disclosure Equilibrium
The condition that E[1, 1|1, 1] > E[0, 0|1, 1] is equivalent to
u+ d >
2 (d(1− r) + ru(1− θ))
(1− rθ) ,




2− θ . (7)
This expression turns out to be a very important determinant of firm be-
havior in the model, and it arises in later sections as well as here. One way to
think about this inequality is that it determines the firm’s disclosure strategy
when the punishment for greenwash is so great as to eliminate partial disclosure
as a viable strategy. In this case, a firm in state (1, 1) must choose between
full disclosure or non-disclosure. Interestingly, it turns out that the market’s
beliefs about the firm’s behavior do not affect the form of inequality (7). The
reason is that at the point of intersection between surface E[1, 1|1, 1] and sur-
face E[0, 0|1, 1], the firm is indifferent between disclosing fully or not at all. As
a result, whether the market expects the firm to disclose fully or not has no
impact on E[0, 0|1, 1].




In Figure 1, E[1, 1|1, 1] = E[1, 0|1, 1] represents the boundary between the
dark-shaded and the medium-shaded surfaces, and E[1, 1|1, 1] = E[0, 0|1, 1] rep-
resents the boundary between the dark and light surfaces (hidden in the dia-
gram). Proposition 1 summarizes the foregoing analysis of the existence of a
full-disclosure equilibrium
Proposition 1 A full disclosure equilibrium exists for all r ≤ min{1/(2 −
θ), αP/(u− d)}.
The basic intuition regarding full disclosure is that when the probability of
success is low, there is little advantage to the firm in hiding a failure, since
undisclosed activities will essentially be branded as failures by the market any-
way.
4.3 Non-Disclosure Equilibrium
The formal requirements for a non-disclosure equilibrium are E[0, 0|1, 1] >
E[1, 1|1, 1] and E[0, 0|1, 1] > E[1, 0|1, 1]. The beliefs consistent with the equilib-
rium are µ(1, 1|1, 1) = µ(1, 0|1, 1) = 0, and µ(0, 0|1, 1) = 1.
Once again, the payoff to full disclosure does not depend upon beliefs because
disclosures are fully verifiable. As in the previous section, the payoff to full
disclosure is
E[1, 1|1, 1] = u+ d.
The payoff to partial disclosure is also unchanged from the previous section.
Here, the beliefs associated with the equilibrium are that a firm in state (1, 1)
chooses not to disclose any information. If the market sees a firm disclose (1, 0)
then, it believes the firm is in state (1, 0). Thus, a firm in state (1, 1) can engage
in greenwash, if it so desires, and obtain payoff
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E[1, 0|1, 1] = u+ (ru+ (1− r)d)− αP.
The payoff to non-disclosure is different than it was in the full disclosure
equilibrium. Specifically, the market now believes there are four types that
choose to not disclose: (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), and (1, 1). The total probability a
firm chooses to not disclose is
Ψ(0, 0) = 1− θr (2− (2− r)θ) .
To the firm that does not disclose, the market assigns an expected value of
E[0, 0|1, 1] = (1− θ)
22(ru+ (1− r)d) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)(d+ (ru+ (1− r)d))
1− θr (2− (2− r)θ)
+
(1− r)2θ22d+ 2r(1− r)θ2(u+ d)
1− θr (2− (2− r)θ) . (9)
A non-disclosure equilibrium requiresE[0, 0|1, 1] > E[1, 1|1, 1] andE[0, 0|1, 1] >
E[1, 0|1, 1]. As in section 4.2, the first of these simplifies to
r >
1
2− θ . (10)
The second requirement, E[0, 0|1, 1] > E[1, 0|1, 1] is equivalent to
(1− r) ¡r2θ2 + 1¢ (u− d) < (1− θr (2− (2− r)θ))αP. (11)
For u = 1.5, d = .5 and αP = .3, the three strategies (full disclosure in
dark shading, non-disclosure in light shading, and partial disclosure in medium
shading) produce payoffs that are represented in Figure 2. The region in which
non-disclosure is a pure-strategy equilibrium is the triangular region where the
dark surface is the highest. Note that the exposed non-disclosure region is
smaller here than in Figure 1. This is because the market believes the firm
will choose to not disclose when the state is (1, 1), and this belief reduces the













Figure 2: Non-Disclosure Equilibrium
The following proposition summarizes the above analysis regarding the non-
disclosure equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A non-disclosure equilibrium exists when r > 1/(2 − θ) and
(1− r) ¡r2θ2 + 1¢ (u− d) > (1− θr (2− (2− r)θ))αP.
Intuitively, the non-disclosure equilibrium exists when the probability of a
success is high, in which case a firm with a failure gains significantly from
hiding it. It is worth noting that r > 1/(2− θ) implies that the non-disclosure
equilibrium can only exist for r > 1/2, since 1/(2 − θ) = 1/2 at θ = 0 and
increases with θ.
4.4 Partial-Disclosure Equilibrium
The formal requirements for this type of equilibrium are E[1, 0|1, 1] > E[1, 1|1, 1]
and E[1, 0|1, 1] > E[0, 0|1, 1]. The beliefs consistent with a partial disclosure
equilibrium are µ(1, 1|1, 1) = µ(0, 0|1, 1) = 0, and µ(1, 0|1, 1) = 1.
As in the previous sections, the payoff to full disclosure does not depend
upon beliefs, and
E[1, 1|1, 1] = u+ d.
In the partial disclosure equilibrium, the market believes the firm in state (1, 1)
will disclose (1, 0). Hence, the payoff to making this disclosure is different than
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it was in the two previous types of equilibrium. Now, there are two situations
when firms disclose (1, 0)–the state is (1, 0) and the state is (1, 1). Thus, the
total probability that a firm discloses (1, 0) is
Ψ(1, 0) = 2rθ(1− θ)µ(1, 0|1, 0) + 2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
= 2rθ(1− rθ)
Using this information, we can compute the expected payoff to partial disclosure
as
E[1, 0|1, 1] = u(1 + r(1− 2θ)) + d(1− r)
1− rθ − αP
The non-disclosure payoff is now the same as it was in the full disclosure equi-
librium, since the market believes there are three types of firms that opt not to
disclose: (0, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 2). Thus, the total probability of non-disclosure
in this equilibrium is
Ψ(0, 0) = (1− θ)2µ(0, 0|0, 0) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1) + (1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2)
= (1− rθ)2
The expected payoff to non-disclosure is
E[0, 0|1, 1] = 2 (d(1− r) + ru(1− θ))
(1− rθ)
For u = 1.5, d = .5 and αP = .3, the three strategies (full disclosure in dark
shading, non-disclosure in light shading, and partial disclosure in medium shad-
ing) produce payoffs that are represented in Figure 3. The partial-disclosure




















Figure 3: Partial Disclosure Equilibrium
Some algebraic manipulation shows that E[1, 0|1, 1] > E[0, 0|1, 1] if
r < rPD/ND ≡ u− d− αP
u− d− θαP , (12)
where the somewhat cumbersome notation rPD/ND indicates the boundary be-
tween partial disclosure and non-disclosure.
Similarly, E[1, 0|1, 1] > E[1, 1|1, 1] reduces to
r > rPD/FD ≡ αP
(u− d)(1− θ) + θαP , (13)
where the notation rPD/FD indicates the boundary between partial disclosure
and full disclosure. A partial disclosure equilibrium exists for r ∈ [rPD/FD, rPD/ND].
It is easy to see that as αP goes to zero, rPD/FD goes to zero and rPD/ND goes
to one. Thus, as the expected penalty becomes negligible, partial disclosure
is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium for all values of r and θ. It is also
immediate that there is no partial disclosure equilibrium in pure strategies if
rPD/FD > rPD/ND. The next proposition characterizes conditions for the ex-
istence of a partial disclosure equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For every θ, a partial disclosure equilibrium exists for some set
of values of r if and only if αP < (u−d)/2. If αP = 0, partial disclosure is the
unique equilibrium for all values of r and θ.
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Proof. Imposing the requirement that rPD/FD > rPD/ND and simplifying yields
(u− d) (d− u+ 2Pα) (θ − 1) < 0. Since u− d > 0 and θ ≤ 1, this is equivalent
to αP < (u− d)/2.
Intuitively, a partial-disclosure equilibrium can only exist when the expected
penalty is not too high. As we will show in more detail in the following section,
if the penalty is made large enough, it will deter any type of firm from engaging
in partial disclosure. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the types of firms
most likely to engage in partial disclosure are not those with particularly high
or low values of r, but rather those with an intermediate likelihood of positive
outcomes. The intuition for this observation is straightforward. Firms with
low values of r fully disclose: they gain a lot from trumpeting a success, and
lose little by withholding information about a failure (since they are already
expected to fail); thus, there is little value in risking public backlash by refusing
to disclose. At the other extreme, firms with high values of r do not disclose
anything: they gain little by disclosing information about successes (since they
are already expected to succeed), and lose a lot by disclosing a failure; thus,
there is little value in risking public backlash by disclosing a success. For firms
with moderate values of r partial disclosure is attractive: disclosing a success
can produce a significant improvement in public perception, and withholding
information about a failure can prevent a significant negative public perception;
thus, they are willing to risk public backlash by disclosing only partially.
It is also interesting to characterize the set of r for which partial disclosure
is an equilibrium as θ increases.
Proposition 4 Let RPD(θ, αP ) = rPD/FD − rPD/ND be the set of values of r
that form a partial disclosure equilibrium for some θ and αP. Then RPD(θ, αP )
is decreasing in θ.
Proof. Some calculation shows that
RPD(θ, αP ) =
(1− θ) (u− d− 2Pα) (u− d)
((u− d)(1− θ) + Pθα) (u− d− Pθα) .




−αθ(u− d)P (u− d− 2Pα) (u− d− Pα) (2− θ)
(u− d− Pθα)2 ((u− d)(θ − 1)− Pθα)2 .
The denominator is positive. Assuming αP < (u−d)/2, which is the condition
for the existence of a partial disclosure equilibrium, we must have (u− d− 2Pα) >
0 and (u− d− Pα) > 0, so dR/dθ < 0.
As shown in Proposition (4), the band of r values that constitute a partial
disclosure equilibrium is larger when θ is small. The reason is that small values
of θ mean that it is likely the firm is uninformed about the performance of its
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projects, and hence the market does not draw strongly negative inferences if the
firm fails to report two outcomes.
It is interesting to think about these issues in the context of Walmart’s recent
conversion to a more promotional stance regarding its social contributions.22
For years, Walmart kept a low profile on social issues, but as it has come under
attack for its low pay and lack of benefits. the company has begun to promote
its good activities more prominently. In terms of our model, this represents
a shift from non-disclosure to partial disclosure. Such a shift is consistent
with the notion that Walmart has experienced a reduction in r, that is, in the
probability that its actions are viewed as socially responsible. Indeed, the
empirical literature in accounting suggests that firms are more likely to engage
in partial disclosure after some sort of public incident that produces damage
to the company’s reputation.23 In our context, this can be interpreted as a
reduction in the market’s estimated probability that the firm produces socially
positive outcomes.
5 The Impact of Alternative Penalties for Green-
wash
The analysis in section 4 established conditions for the existence of different
types of pure-strategy disclosure equilibria.24 These equilibria depend upon
different sets of beliefs on the part of participants in the disclosure game, and
depend upon the parameters r, θ and αP . In this section, we characterize the
number of different types of pure strategy equilibria, and their dependence on
r and θ, as the expected penalty for greenwash, αP, increases. We begin by
characterizing the “extreme" cases, that is, when αP = 0 and when αP is so
large as to eliminate partial disclosure as a profitable strategy. We then turn
to a detailed comparative static analysis of the set of equilibria as αP increases
over this domain.
5.1 The Set of Equilibria as Penalties Increase
It is easy to see from our discussion in previous sections that when αP =
0, partial disclosure is the only equilibrium strategy for a firm in state (1, 1)
Disclosing (1, 0) produces a positive effect on external beliefs about the firm,
and carries with it no penalty. Thus, partial disclosure dominates either full
disclosure or no disclosure.
As expected penalties increase, there comes a point where partial disclosure
is no longer an equilibrium strategy because of the expected penalties associated
22A speech on the topic by Walmart’s CEO can be found at
http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/21st%20Century%20Leadership.pdf
23 See Deegan and Deegan (1996).
24The conditions presented in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a,b) imply that there are mixed-
strategy equilibria for parameter values (r, θ) for which no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
We discuss mixed strategy equilibria in more detail below.
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with using this strategy. Indeed, Proposition 3 shows that the partial disclosure
equilibrium disappears for αP ≥ (u− d)/2.
Even if the penalty is high enough to eliminate partial disclosure as an
equilibrium, partial disclosure may stll be attractive as a strategy that may
possibly overturn one of the other types of pure-strategy equilibria. Recall from
Figures 1 and 2 that even in the full disclosure and non-disclosure equilibria,
there are parameter values r and θ for which partial disclosure is profitable.
Thus, an important question is whether there is some level of penalty sufficient
to prevent firms from engaging in partial disclosure, regardless of what type of
equilibrium is being played. If so, then the firm must choose between either
full disclosure or no disclosure. This is the subject of the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For αP ≥ (u − d), there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium for all
values of r and θ, and it involves either full disclosure or non-disclosure.
Proof. As shown in Proposition 1, a full disclosure equilibrium exists for all
r ≤ min{1/(2−θ), αP/(u−d)}. We know that 1/(2−θ) ∈ [.5, 1] for all θ. Hence
for αP ≥ (u − d), we know that αP/(u − d) > 1/(2 − θ), and full disclosure
is an equilibrium for all r ≤ 1/(2 − θ). As shown in Proposition 2, a non-
disclosure equilibrium exists for r > 1/(2 − θ) and (1− r) ¡r2θ2 + 1¢ (u− d) ≥
(1 − θr (2− (2− r)θ))αP. For αP = (u − d), the second condition reduces to
(1− r) ¡r2θ2 + 1¢ ≥ (1−θr (2− (2− r)θ)) Numerical calculations on a 200 by
200 grid show that this inequality holds for all r ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1].
The foregoing Lemma shows that if the expected penalty for corporate green-
wash is at least u−d, then partial disclosure is never an optimal strategy, regard-
less of the type of equilibrium being played. This is intuitive. The maximum
benefit the firm can possibly obtain from greenwash is u−d. This would occur if
the firm has a very high value of r, so the market grants the firm expected value
of u for undisclosed outcomes, whereas it would have gotten a d if it revealed
the failure. If the penalty is large enough to outweigh this maximum possible
benefit to partial disclosure, then it will deter firms from using this strategy.
If αP ≥ (u−d), the firm in state (1, 1) simply chooses between full disclosure
or non-disclosure. As shown in section 4, this decision turns upon whether or
not r < 1/(2 − θ), with full disclosure the equilibrium if the inequality holds,
and non-disclosure the equilibrium if it does not.
One implication of the lemma is that when monitoring is imperfect, i.e.
α < 1, the actual penalty that must be imposed to deter greenwash is poten-
tially much greater than the difference in value between a successful project and
a failure. For companies engaged in high-value acts of corporate social respon-
sibility, this means that the penalties required to prevent partial disclosure may
be so high that NGOs are unlikely to be able to produce them.
Having established results for minimal and maximal penalties, we turn now
to the task of characterizing equilibria as the expected penalty ranges across
this interval.
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Proposition 6 For αP = 0, partial disclosure is the unique pure strategy equi-
librium for all (r, θ). For αP ∈ (0, (u− d)/2), each of the three types of pure-
strategy equilibria can be supported for some values of (r, θ), and there are also
(r, θ) pairs for which no pure strategy equilibrium exists. For αP > (u− d)/2,
there exist (r, θ) pairs with r > 1/(2 − θ) for which non-disclosure is a pure-
strategy equilibrium and (r, θ) pairs with r < 1/(2−θ) for which full disclosure is
a pure strategy equilibrium; there also exist (r, θ) pairs for which no pure strategy
equilibrium exists. For αP > (u−d), non-disclosure is the unique pure-strategy
equilibrium for all r > 1/(2 − θ) and full disclosure is the unique pure-strategy
equilibrium for r < 1/(2− θ).
Proof. We approach the parts of the Proposition in sequence. (1) Inequalities
(12) and (13) show that when αP = 0, a partial-disclosure equilibrium exists
for all r ∈ [0, 1]. (2) Inequality (11) shows that when αP = 0, a non-disclosure
equilibrium exists only in the limit as r→ 1. Finally, inequality (8) shows that
when αP = 0, a full-disclosure equilbrium exists only in the limit as r → 0.
(3) Proposition 2 shows that a partial disclosure equilibrium exists for αP <
(u−d)/2. Inequality (11) shows that when αP > 0, a non-disclosure equilibrium
exists for large enough r. Finally, Proposition 1 shows that when αP > 0, a
full-disclosure equilbrium exists for r small enough. (4) See Lemma 5.
The foregoing proposition shows that for penalties of low magnitude, that
is, for αP ∈ (0, (u − d)/2), each of the three types of pure-strategy equilibria
exist for at least some value of (r, θ). However, it is also true that pure-strategy
equilibria do not exist for all (r, θ) pairs. This is illustrated in Figure 4 for the
case where u = 1.5, d = .5, and αP = .3. This figure effectively projects the
equilbrium regions from each of Figures 1-2 onto a single (r, θ) plane The non-
disclosure region lies above the uppermost (pink) curve, the partial-disclosure
region lies between the next two (light green and dark green, if you are reading
the electronic version of the paper) curves, and the full-disclosure region lies
below the lowest (brown) line. However there are no pure-strategy equilibria
for (r, θ) pairs between these regions (i.e., between the dark green and pink
curves, and between the light green and brown curves). In the first of these
regions, labeled “MixNP ”, firms employ a mixed strategy that involves mixing
between non-disclosure and partial disclosure.. In the second, labeled “MixFP ,"
firms mix between full disclosure and partial disclosure.25
[Figure 4 about here]
It is worth emphasizing that the types of firms most likely to engage in par-
tial disclosure are not those with particularly high or low values of r, but rather
those with an intermediate likelihood of positive outcomes. The intuition for
this observation is straightforward. Firms with low values of r fully disclose:
they gain a lot from trumpeting a success, and lose little by withholding in-
formation about a failure (since they are already expected to fail); thus, there
25The existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in these regions is established by applying the
analysis of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a,b).
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is little value in risking public backlash by refusing to disclose. At the other
extreme, firms with high values of r do not disclose anything: they gain little
by disclosing information about successes (since they are already expected to
succeed), and lose a lot by disclosing a failure; thus, there is little value in risk-
ing public backlash by disclosing a success. For firms with moderate values of
r partial disclosure is attractive: disclosing a success can produce a significant
improvement in public perception, and withholding information about a failure
can prevent a significant negative public perception; thus, they are willing to
risk public backlash by disclosing only partially.
Similarly, for penalties of medium size, i.e. αP ∈ ((u−d)/2, u−d), two types
of pure-strategy equilibria exist, but it is also true that pure-strategy equilibria
do not exist for all (r, θ) pairs. This is illustrated in Figure 5 for the case
where u = 1.5, d = .5, and αP = .5. Again, the non-disclosure region lies above
the uppermost (pink) curve, and the full-disclosure region lies below the lowest
(brown) line. Note that there is no partial disclosure region, because the penalty
is large enough to eliminate it as an equilibrium. From a graphical perspective,
the two former (green) curves bounding the partial disclosure region have col-
lapsed into what is now shown as a single (red) curve in the middle of the graph.
Once again, there are two regions in which there are no pure-strategy equilib-
ria: the region labeled “MixNP ”,in which firms employ a mixed strategy that
involves mixing between non-disclosure and partial disclosure, and.the second,
labeled “MixFP ,” in which firms mix between full disclosure and partial disclo-
sure. Thus, even though partial disclosure is not a pure strategy equilibrium
for any (r, θ) pairs, it is still part of the mixed strategies in the aforementioned
regions.
[Figure 5 about here]
Finally, for αP > u − d, partial disclosure is eliminated even as a part
of mixed strategies. As a result, non-disclosure is the unique pure-strategy
equilibrium for all r > 1/(2− θ) and full disclosure is the unique pure-strategy
equilibrium for r < 1/(2− θ). This is illustrated in Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here]
5.2 Implications for NGO Strategic Targeting of Firms
From both a positive perspective, and from the perspective of designing NGO
strategies, it is critically important to understand how increasing the penalty
for greenwash affects the equilibrium for different values of r and θ. Consider
a shift from a low penalty to a high one, that is, from Figure 4 to Figure
6. Points in Figure 4 that lie between the upper curve and the dashed curve
in the middle of the partial disclosure region shift from involving the use of
partial disclosure (either in a pure or mixed strategy) to a pure strategy of
non-disclosure. In contrast, points that lie between the dashed curve in the
partial disclosure region and the straight line at the top of the full disclosure
region in Figure 4 shift from strategies that use partial disclosure (either in a
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pure or mixed strategy) to a pure strategy of full disclosure. Activists hope
that by punishing corporate greenwash they will induce firms to become more
transparent, and (in the language of our paper) to engage in full disclosure. Our
analysis reveals that whether this hope is realized depends critically upon the
values of r and θ for a particular firm. Firms with low levels of r (“irresponsible
firms”) may well make this behavioral shift in response to large penalties for
greenwash. However, firms with relatively high values of r (“responsible firms”)
and relatively low values of θ are likely to shift to non-disclosure instead. This
is not only contrary to the desires of activists, but–since some information is
better than none for investors–it makes society as a whole worse off.
The types of firms for which such perverse outcomes are most likely are “re-
sponsible” or ”clean” firms with limited knowledge of the environmental and
social impacts of their actions. This lack of knowledge could be because the
firm is engaged in projects with long time horizons, or because the firm lacks
strong internal monitoring and management systems for dealing with environ-
mental and social issues. Interestingly, this implies that the firms that are
the most appropriate targets for activist pressure are those that are likely to
be well informed–which does seem consistent with casual observation of the
types of firms singled out for punishment as greenwashers. In an environmen-
tal context, our model suggests that firms in “irresponsible” industries that are
well informed are the best targets for activist pressure. Companies such as
BP, Shell, Monsanto, and Enron have been targeted by activists in the past,
and appear to fit our model well. Still, it is important for activists to keep in
mind that punishing corporate greenwash is a double-edged sword and should
be wielded carefully.26
6 Environmental Management Systems andNGO
Auditing
As noted above, NGO auditing of greenwash is not guaranteed to be socially
valuable. It is particularly likely to backfire, and lead to non-disclosure, for
poorly informed firms in clean industries, that is, when r is large and/or θ is
small. The policy is more likely to be successful for firms where r is small and/or
θ is large. This observation suggests that there is a complementarity between
the NGO’s auditing activities and the presence of environmental management
systems (EMS) within the audited firms, which would be interpreted in our
model as increasing θ. In our model, however, firms have no incentive to adopt
an EMS, since the firm’s market value in the interim period is lower when it
adopts an EMS, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In the interim period, the firm’s value in the partial disclosure
equilibrium is decreasing in θ. It’s value in the full disclosure or non-disclosure
equilibria is unaffected by θ.
26For an interesting empirical analysis of the targeting behavior of NGOs, see Easley and
Lennox (2006).
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Proof. Differentiating equation (3) with respect to θ yields dVPD/dθ = (u −
d)(N − s)(dq/dθ). All terms in this expression are positive with the possible
exception of dq/dθ. Recalling that q = (r−θr)/(1−θr), and differentiating this
expression yields dq/dθ = −r(1 − r)/(1 − θr)2 < 0. Thus, dVPD/dθ < 0. It is
straightforward to see that VFD = u+ d and VND = N(ru+ (1− r)d), neither
of which is a function of θ.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. In the partial disclosure equi-
librium, the manager withholds unfavorable information to increase its market
value. This strategy works because for each withheld piece of information, the
market valuation of the firm reflects only the possibility, not the certainty, of a
failure. However, as the likelihood increases that the manager knows the envi-
ronmental outcomes of the firm’s activities, the market increasingly interprets
non-disclosure as withheld negative information rather than as true uncertainty
on the part of the manager. Adopting an EMS improves the manager’s in-
ternal information, and thus makes the market increasingly skeptical when the
manager does not fully disclose all possible environmental information.
Admittedly, our model does not incorporate the benefits of an EMS in terms
of improved internal control and ability to comply with environmental regula-
tions. Nevertheless, our analysis does identify a countervailing incentive that
tends to deter firms from adopting EMSs. Furthermore, our story is broadly
consistent with the empirical results of Delmas (2000), who finds that many
firms elect not to adopt ISO 14001 (a particular form of EMS) because they
wish to limit public access to internal information about their environmental
performance.
Our results suggest that public policy pressures may be required to induce a
broad cross-section of firms to adopt EMSs. Interestingly, Coglianese and Nash
(2001, p. 15) find that there has been “an explosion of programs in the United
States that offer financial and regulatory incentives to firms that implement
EMSs." These programs are being implemented at both the federal and state
levels. Whether these programs are likely to achieve their objectives is unclear.
Coglianese and Nash (2001, p. 16) point out that “[a]ll of these policy initiatives
are premised on the assumption that EMSs make a difference in environmen-
tal performance. Yet this question merits research and evidence rather than
untested optimism.” Our analysis points to a different rationale for encouraging
firms to adopt EMSs. We do not presume that an EMS makes any difference
in environmental performance, but instead simply assume an EMS improves the
manager’s internal information about the firm’s environmental performance. In
this capacity, an EMS operates as a complement to NGO auditing of environ-
mental disclosure and greenwash. With an EMS in place, when a manager
discloses nothing about the firm’s environmental performance, the market in-
fers that the manager is failing to disclose some negative information, and thus
downgrades its rating of the firm’s value. The threat that his firm’s stock will
be devalued makes a manager less willing to adopt a policy of non-disclosure.
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In turn, this means that an NGO’s threat to punish greenwash is more likely to
drive the manager to disclose fully rather than to not disclose at all.
Our analysis points to a new rationale for encouraging firms to adopt EMSs,
one that does not appear to have been recognized in prior literature, either by
academics or practitioners. In effect, the presence of the EMS brings the market
closer to a state of common knowledge, thereby increasing market efficiency.
With an EMS in place, the manager is more likely to be well informed about
his firm’s own environmental impact, but more importantly, the market knows
that the manager is more likely to be well informed. As a result the manager
is unable to hide behind the veil of ignorance when he fails to fully disclose the
impacts of his firm’s actions, and is thereby pressured to fully disclose.
7 Mandatory Disclosure Requirements
Even when conditions are such that punishing greenwash can actually induce
greater disclosure rather than less disclosure, such punishment is never enough
to bring about full disclosure of environmental information in all states of the
world. The reason is that managers with no successful activities to point to
can simply remain silent about their failures without fear of punitive action by
the NGO. This observation suggests that it is not greenwash per se that is
the fundamental problem, it is the failure to fully disclose. In this section, we
consider an alternative approach to inducing disclosure of environmental infor-
mation, namely relying upon legislation that mandates disclosure and penalizes
firms that fail to comply. The Public Company Accounting and Reform Act of
2002 (commonly know as Sarbanes-Oxley) was signed into law in July of 2002,
and contains a number of provisions that require publicly traded companies to
improve the accuracy of their financial disclosures and establish better internal
controls for financial reporting. One area where better internal controls will
likely be needed is in developing processes to identify, track, quantify and assess
the financial impact of potential environmental liabilities.
In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has promul-
gated Regulation S-K, which contains several items affecting the disclosure of
environmental costs and liabilities. In particular, Item 101 requires companies
to disclose material effects of compliance (or non-compliance) with environmen-
tal laws, Item 103 requires disclosure of pending, non-routine litigation (with
environmental litigation typically being considered non-routine), and Item 303
requires disclosure of business trends or events likely to have a material effect of
a company’s financial condition. One can easily see how certain environmental
“trends or events” such as discovery of environmental contamination (e.g. PCB
in fish) might have such a material effect. Of these, Item 303 is perhaps most
closely related to our analysis. It is important to note that even this provision
leaves substantial room for managerial discretion in determining what is ”likely”
and what is a ”material effect.”
Below we revisit the valuation table for the firm, with F (bs, bf ; s, f) the fine
levied by the regulator if an audit determines the manager failed to comply with
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disclosure regulations.27 It is unnecessary for the regulator to punish firms that
fail to report good news, since market forces will induce firms to report good
news without the need for regulation.
2 V1(0, 2)
1 V1(0, 1)− αF (0, 1; s, f) V1(1, 1)
0 V1(0, 0)− αF (0, 0; s, f) V1(1, 0)− αF (1, 0; s, f) V1(2, 0)bfÁbs 0 1 2
Table 3: The Firm’s Value for Possible Reports (bs, bf) in period 1
There are three states to investigate: (0, 1), (0, 2), and (1, 1). (Firms in
states (1, 0) and (2, 0) have no reason to not disclose, while type (0, 0) has no
options.) Note that states (0, 1) and (0, 2) were not part of our analysis in
sections 4 and 5, because they do not involve ”greenwash” proper, that is, they
don’t involve any reporting of positive information. We consider the three
relevant states in turn.
State (0, 1) : If the state is (0, 1), there are two possible reports: (0, 1) or
(0, 0). If the manager reports (0, 1), the market knows the state is either (0, 1)
or (0, 2). (The firm has no incentive to report (0, 1) in state (1, 1).) Thus,
E[0, 1|0, 1] = [d+(ru+(1−r)d)]2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 1|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 1)
+2d




E[0, 0|0, 1] = 2(ru+ (1− r)d) (1− θ)
2
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)]2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
+[2d]
(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2)
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [u+ d]
2r(1− r)θ2µ(0, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
− αF (0, 0; 0, 1).
State (0, 2): If the state is (0, 2), there are three possible reports: (0, 2),
(0, 1) or (0, 0). If the manager fully discloses, the market can confirm this fact
and the firm’s value is
E[0, 2|0, 2] = 2d.
If the manager reports (0, 1), the market knows the state is either (0, 1) or (0, 2).
(Again, the firm in state (1, 1) has no incentive to report (0, 1).) Thus,
E[0, 1|0, 2] = [d+(ru+(1−r)d)]2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 1|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 1)
+2d
(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 1|0, 2)
Ψ(0, 1)
−αF (0, 1; 0, 2).
27We assume the regulator commits to an audit program in advance. Thus, there is no
issue of whether the regulator would really want to follow through on the audit in a truthful
reporting equilibrium.
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If the firm reports (0, 0), the market believes the state could be (0, 0), (0, 1),
(0, 2) or (1, 1). Noting that µ(0, 0|0, 0) = 1, we can write the firm’s expected
value as
E[0, 0|0, 2] = 2[ru+ (1− r)d] (1− θ)
2
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)]2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
+[2d]
(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2)
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [u+ d]
2r(1− r)θ2µ(0, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
− αF (0, 0; 0, 2).
State (1, 1): If the state is (1, 1) and the firm reports (1, 1), the market
knows the state for certain, and the firm has market value
E[1, 1|1, 1] = u+ d.
If the firm reports (1, 0), then the market believes it is either a (1, 0) and
revealing truthfully, a (2, 0) failing to report a success, or a (1, 1) and engaging
in greenwash. The firm’s expected value in this case is






2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(1, 0)
− αF (1, 0; 1, 1).
If the firm reports (0, 0), then the market will conclude this report might
have come from a firm in states (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2) or (1, 1). The firm receives
an expected value of
E[0, 0|1, 1] = [2(ru+ (1− r)d)] (1− θ)
2
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)]2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
+[2d]
(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2)
Ψ(0, 0)
+ [u+ d]
2r(1− r)θ2µ(0, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
− αF (0, 0; 1, 1).
7.1 The Full Disclosure Equilibrium
We are interested in the conditions that will induce the firm to disclose fully
in all states of the world. In the full disclosure equilibrium, the market will
assesses µ(s, f |s, f) = 1 and µ(bs, bf |s, f) = 0 for any bs 6= s or bf 6= f. For full
disclosure to be incentive compatible, we must have
E(s, f |s, f) > E(bs, bf |s, f) ∀bs, bf 6= s, f.
The following conditions must hold in a full disclosure equilibrium
E[0, 1|0, 1] > E[0, 0|0, 1]⇒ d+(ru+(1−r)d) > 2(ru+(1−r)d)−αF (0, 0; 0, 1).
E[0, 2|0, 2] > E[0, 1|0, 2]⇒ 2d > d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)− αF (0, 1; 0, 2).
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E[0, 2|0, 2] > E[0, 0|0, 2]⇒ 2d > 2(ru+ (1− r)d)− αF (0, 0; 0, 2).
E[1, 1|1, 1] > E[1, 0|1, 1]⇒ u+ d > u+ (ru+ (1− r)d)− αF (1, 0; 1, 1).
E[1, 1|1, 1] > E[0, 0|1, 1]⇒ u+ d > 2(ru+ (1− r)d)− αF (0, 0; 1, 1).
A bit of algebra shows that the fines necessary to induce full disclosure in each
state are
F (0, 0; 0, 1) > F (0, 0; 0, 1) ≡ r(u− d)
α
.
F (0, 1; 0, 2) > F (0, 1; 0, 2) ≡ r(u− d)
α
.
F (0, 0; 0, 2) > F (0, 0; 0, 2) ≡ 2r (u− d)
α
.
F (1, 0; 1, 1) > F (1, 0; 1, 1) ≡ r(u− d)
α
.
F (0, 0; 1, 1) > F (0, 0; 1, 1) ≡ (u− d) (2r − 1)
α
.
It is easy to show that F (0, 0; 0, 2) > F (1, 0; 1, 1) = F (0, 0; 0, 1) = F (0, 1; 0, 2) >
F (0, 0; 1, 1). This is intuitively reasonable–the firm has strongest incentives
to not disclose when it has two failures. It is straightforward to establish a
sufficient condition on penalties that will induce full disclosure, as noted in the
following proposition.
Proposition 8 Full disclosure can be induced through a policy of mandatory
disclosure that includes penalties at least as great as 2r(u− d)/α for failures to
disclose.
The proposition shows that mandatory disclosure requirements, with the
requisite level of fines, are more powerful instruments than penalizing greenwash
alone. As we found earlier, full disclosure in all states of the world can never be
achieved simply by auditing and punishing greenwash. Furthermore, the NGO’s
ability to deter greenwash depends importantly on the values of parameters such
as r and θ. Mandatory disclosure requirements offer the ability to eliminate
withholding of information in all states, for any r and θ.
Although mandatory disclosure rules are attractive in principle, in practice
they may require the use of fines that are too large to be politically feasible.
If so, then there is no guarantee that a mandatory disclosure law will be more
effective than auditing by an NGO. We turn to this issue in the following
section.
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7.2 Limited Regulatory Penalties
In the previous section, we showed that if there are no constraints on penalties
for failure to disclose information, then legislative requirements can induce com-
panies to fully disclose their environmental risks. Often, however, government
penalties are less than would be required to prevent socially damaging corporate
action.28 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, firms may face fines of up to $5 million, and
corporate managers may face up to $1 million in fines. Unfortunately, fines of
this magnitude are unlikely to induce truthful disclosure from firms of any sub-
stantial size. To get a sense of the magnitudes required, note that Konar and
Cohen (1998) find that poor environmental performance significantly reduced
the intangible asset value of firms in the S&P 500, with the average intangi-
ble liability valued at $360 million. For purposes of calibration, then, suppose
the firm has 10 activities with significant negative environmental impacts, and
that the figure from Konar and Cohen thus represents the impact of 10 failures.
Then, N(u − d) = $360 million. If 10% of firms are likely to be audited, so
that α = .1, then the fine required to induce full disclosure for the average firm
would be $3.6 billion. If this rough calculation is even remotely correct, the $5
million fine that can be levied under Sarbanes-Oxley is nowhere close to enough
to discipline the reporting behavior of large firms.
If political constraints limit the fines that can be imposed, then the full
disclosure equilibrium will fail to exist. In this case, it is natural to ask
whether NGO auditing might complement mandatory disclosure requirements,
and thereby restore the full disclosure equilibrium. We explore this question in
the remainder of this section.
From section 7.1, we know that it is most difficult to induce full disclosure
by a firm in state (0, 2). In addition, we know that NGO punishment of green-
wash affects only the incentives of firms in state (1, 1). Suppose the maximum











In this case, mandatory disclosure rules are sufficient to deter greenwash, but
not strong enough to induce a firm with two failures to reveal them. Since
greenwash is already deterred by the mandatory disclosure rules, NGO auditing
provides no additional effect on behavior.
If Fmax < r(u−d)/α, then NGO auditing may in principle improve reporting
behavior. Consider the case where
Fmax ∈
µ







If mandatory disclosure rules exist, but there is no NGO auditing, then a firm in
state (1, 1) will be deterred from disclosing (0, 0), but will report (1, 0). Auditing
28For example, many authors have criticized the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) for setting fines that are too low to deter corporate safety violations. For
details, see Weil (1996).
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by the NGO will improve incentives if α(Fmax + P ) > r(u− d).
7.3 Mandatory Disclosure, NGO Auditing, and EMS
Given the magnitude of the fines needed to induce full disclosure, it is possible
that even the combination of government-mandated fines and NGO penalties
will fall short of the levels needed to induce full disclosure. If this is the
case, then EMSs re-emerge as a complementary tool that may enhance the
effectiveness of the other two mechanisms.
If legislatively-mandated fines are very small, e.g., if Fmax < (u−d)(2r−1)/α,
The total penalty that can be imposed on the firm for greenwashing is increased
by the amount of the government-imposed fine, but this will not induce full
disclosure in all states.
If fines are moderate in size, matters become more complex. If Fmax >
(u− d)(2r − 1)/α, then a firm in state (1, 1) would be deterred from reporting
(0, 0) if all other types had incentives to report truthfully. However, if types
(0, 1) and/or (0, 2) have incentives to report (0, 0), then (u−d)(2r−1)/α is not a
sufficiently large fine to prevent the (1, 1) type firm from opting not to disclose.
The firm’s adoption of an EMS would improve matters, reducing incentives for
non-disclosure.
In general, none of the three tools discussed here is likely to be sufficient to
induce full disclosure of environmental liabilities by corporations. Combining
the three offers promise for improving corporate disclosure, but a full analysis
of the interplay between the three is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusions
This paper has presented what is to our knowledge the first economic analy-
sis of greenwash. We defined greenwash as the selective disclosure of positive
information about a company’s environmental performance, without full dis-
closure of negative information on these dimensions. We then modeled the
phenomenon using tools from the literature on financial disclosure. In our
model, a non-governmental organization (NGO) can audit corporate environ-
mental reports, and penalize firms caught engaging in greenwash. Our model
is relatively simple, yet produces some interesting positive implications. We
show that the types of firms most likely to engage in partial disclosure are those
with an intermediate probability of producing positive environmental and so-
cial outcomes. For such firms, disclosing a success can produce a significant
improvement in public perception, and withholding information about a failure
can prevent a significant negative public perception; thus, they are willing to
risk public backlash by disclosing only partially. We also show that public out-
rage over corporate greenwash is more likely to induce a firm to become more
open and transparent if the firm operates in an industry that is likely to have
socially or environmentally damaging impacts, and if the firm is relatively well
informed about its environmental social impacts. This description fits quite
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well with the broad types of firms typically singled out for scrutiny and outrage
by activists.
The model also has interesting normative implications. We show that there
is a real possibility that the threat of public backlash for greenwash will cause
firms to “clam up” rather than become more open and transparent. In par-
ticular, such a response is likely from socially responsible firms with a high
probability of successful projects, yet who are not fully informed about the
social impacts of their actions. In an environmental context one might charac-
terize such firms as “poorly informed firms in clean industries.” For firms such
as this, activist pressures may backfire and produce exactly the opposite of the
intended results.
The likelihood that a firm responds to the threat of NGO auditing by opting
for non-disclosure is reduced if the firm has adopted an environmental man-
agement system (EMS), and the complementarity between EMSs and NGO
auditing of greenwash points to a benefit from public policies that mandate the
adoption of EMSs. Indeed, our analysis points to a new rationale for encour-
aging firms to adopt EMSs An EMS brings the market closer to a state of
common knowledge, thereby increasing market efficiency. With an EMS in
place, the manager is better informed about his firm’s environmental impact,
and the market knows that the manager is better informed. As a result the
manager is unable to hide behind the veil of ignorance when he fails to fully
disclose the impacts of his firm’s actions, and is thereby pressured to fully dis-
close.
We also studied mandatory disclosure policies, and found that they have
the potential to induce managers to fully disclose information about their firms’
environmental activities in all states of the world. However, the fines neces-
sary to induce full disclosure may be so large as to be politically unpalatable.
If this is the case, then disclosure may require the use of a set of complemen-
tary instruments, including mandatory disclosure standards, NGO auditing and
implementation of EMSs.
There are a number of areas in which further research would be valuable.
One need is for empirical study of greenwash, its effects on corporate valua-
tion, and its interaction with NGO information campaigns. Ramus and Mon-
tiel (2005) represents one needed step in this direction, as does Kim and Lyon
(2006). Yet more work is needed before we have a robust empirical understand-
ing of the phenomenon. A second need is to explore more fully the motivations
of activist groups that monitor and punish corporate hypocrites. Articulating
their objective functions–maximizing membership, maximizing financial con-
tributions, affecting change in the industry, or some mix of the above–would
allow for a strategic analysis of activist behavior, and the equilibrium of such
a model would produce further insights into corporate non-market strategy.29
Third, it would also be interesting to extend the model so that the firm’s ac-
tivities are heterogeneous in nature, varying in cost, likelihood of success, and
29Baron and Diermeier (2005) present a model of strategic activism in which the activist
punishes firms for their socially or environmentally harmful practices, rather than for green-
wash.
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social or environmental impact. This would allow for an analysis of firms’ in-
centives to invest in projects known to have a high probability of success but
low social or environmental value, an accusation leveled against some firms. In
this case, partial disclosure may divert scarce funds from valuable risky projects
to relatively certain but low-value projects.
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Appendix
In this appendix we present some derivations of formulae that appear in
simplified form in the text.
Full Disclosure Equilibrium
Ψ(0, 0) = (1− θ)2 + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ) + (1− r)2θ2
= (1− rθ)2
E[0, 0|1, 1] = (1− θ)
22(ru+ (1− r)d)µ(0, 0|0, 0)
Ψ(0, 0)
+
2(1− r)θ(1− θ)[d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)]µ(0, 0|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
+
(1− r)2θ22dµ(0, 0|0, 2) + 2r(1− r)θ2(u+ d)µ(0, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
=






2 (d(1− r) + ru(1− θ))
(1− rθ)
In addition,
Ψ(1, 0) = 2rθ(1− θ)µ(1, 0|1, 0) + r2θ2µ(1, 0|2, 0) + 2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
= 2rθ(1− θ)






2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(1, 0)
− αP
= (u+ (ru+ (1− r)d))2rθ(1− θ)
Ψ(1, 0)
− αP
= u+ (ru+ (1− r)d)− αP
Non-Disclosure Equilibrium
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Ψ(0, 0) = 1− Pr(1, 0)− Pr(2, 0)
= 1− 2θr(1− θ)− r2θ2
= 1− θr (2− (2− r)θ)
E[0, 0|1, 1] = (1− θ)
22(ru+ (1− r)d) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)(d+ (ru+ (1− r)d))
1− θr (2− (2− r)θ)
+
(1− r)2θ22d+ 2r(1− r)θ2(u+ d)
1− θr (2− (2− r)θ) .
Partial Disclosure Equilibrium
Ψ(1, 0) = 2rθ(1− θ)µ(1, 0|1, 0) + 2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
= 2rθ(1− rθ)






2r(1− r)θ2µ(1, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(1, 0)
− αP






= (u+ (ru+ (1− r)d)) 2rθ(1− θ)
2rθ(1− rθ) + (u+ d)
2r(1− r)θ2
2rθ(1− rθ) − αP
=
u(1 + r(1− 2θ)) + d(1− r)
1− rθ − αP.
Ψ(0, 0) = (1− θ)2µ(0, 0|0, 0) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)µ(0, 0|0, 1)
+(1− r)2θ2µ(0, 0|0, 2) + 2r(1− r)θ2µ(0, 0|1, 1)
= (1− rθ)2
E[0, 0|1, 1] = (1− θ)
22(ru+ (1− r)d)µ(0, 0|0, 0) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)(d+ (ru+ (1− r)d))µ(0, 0|0, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
+
(1− r)2θ22dµ(0, 0|0, 2) + 2r(1− r)θ2(u+ d)µ(0, 0|1, 1)
Ψ(0, 0)
=
(1− θ)22(ru+ (1− r)d) + 2(1− r)θ(1− θ)(d+ (ru+ (1− r)d)) + (1− r)2θ22d
Ψ(0, 0)
=
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Figure 4: Low-Penalty Case
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Figure 5: Medium-Penalty Case
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Figure 6: High-Penalty Case
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